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Abstract
During the past three decades, the cities of the developing world in
general, and of Africa in particular, have witnessed a remarkable and in
many ways unprecedented demographic growth spurt. Despite some slowdown in rates of increase in the past few years as a result of falling wages,
contracting social services, and changing demographic trends, contemporary urban areas remain the growth poles of economic progress and the
lightning rods of political and social unrest. Nowhere is this dilemma more
visible nor the resulting problems more intractable than in the crowded
cities of sub-Saharan Africa, where projections of urban population growth
remain the highest in the world.
This essay focuses on the conceptual, empirical, and policy-relevant
linkages among urbanization, rural–urban migration, and economic development. First, recent trends and future scenarios for urban population growth
are reviewed, with special emphasis on African urbanization. Then, the
growth and significance of the urban informal economy and the role of
women in informal economic activities are examined. Rural–urban migration is discussed in both a descriptive and an analytical framework; the
economic crisis in Africa and its relationship to urbanization and migration
are considered. An analysis of policy options designed to ameliorate the
deteriorating economic, social, and environmental dilemmas posed by
Africa’s rapid urban growth concludes the study.

This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission
from the author.

One of the most significant of all postwar demographic phenomena
and the one that promises to loom even larger in the future is the rapid growth
of cities in developing countries. In 1950, some 275 million people were
living in third world cities, 38 percent of the 724 million total urban population. According to United Nations estimates, the world’s urban population
had reached 2.3 billion by 1990, with 61 percent (1.4 billion) living in the
cities of developing countries. The UN projects that in 2025, more than 4
billion, or 77 percent of the urban dwellers of the world, will reside in less
developed regions. This number will represent an overall increase of 186
percent, or 2.61 billion new urbanites in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
since 1990. Depending on the nature of development strategies pursued, the
total in 2025 could be substantially higher or lower than the 4 billion estimate. Figure 1 provides a three-stage portrayal of the projected growth of

Figure 1 Urban population estimates and projections, developing regions
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urban populations in four developing regions and China between 1950 and
2000; Table 1 presents a more detailed statistical breakdown with projections to 2025.1
With regard to particular cities, current rates of population growth range
from less than 1 percent per annum in two of the world’s largest cities, Tokyo and New York, to more than 6 percent per annum in many African cities,
including Nairobi, Lagos, and Lusaka. In Asia and Latin America, many
cities are growing at rates in excess of 5 percent per annum. Table 2 provides
data on the world’s 15 largest cities in 1950 and 1995 together with UN
projections to 2015. In 1950, only four of the 15 were in the developing
world. Their combined population was 19 million. In 1995, 12 out of the 15
largest cities were in the developing world, with a total population of 152
Table 1 Urban population estimates and projections in major world regions, 1950–2025 (millions)
Population
Region
World
More-developed
regions
Less-developed
regions
Africa
Latin America
Asia

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000a

2025a

724

1,012

1,352

1,807

2,282

3,208

5,187

449

573

698

834

881

965

1,177

275
32
68
218

439
50
107
342

654
83
162
407

972
133
241
596

1,401
206
315
879

2,101
331
413
1,291

4,011
857
592
2,556

Sources: United Nations (1980), Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth. New
York: United Nations. Pii Elina Berghäll (1995), Habitat II and the Urban Economy: A
Review of Recent Developments and Literature. Helsinki: United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research. Tables 2 and 4.
a

Estimate.
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Table 2

City

The world’s fifteen largest cities, 1950, 1995, and 2015 (millions)
1950
Population
(millions)

1. New York
2. London
3. Tokyo
4. Paris
5. Moscow
6. Shanghai
7. Essen
8. Buenos Aires
9. Chicago
10. Calcutta
11. Osaka
12. Los Angeles
13. Beijing
14. Milan
15. Berlin

12.3
8.7
6.9
5.4
5.4
5.3
5.3
5.0
4.9
4.4
4.1
4.0
3.9
3.6
3.3

1995
Population
(millions)

City
Tokyo
São Paulo
New York
Mexico City
Bombay
Shanghai
Los Angeles
Beijing
Calcutta
Seoul
Jakarta
Buenos Aires
Tianjin
Osaka
Lagos

26.8
16.4
16.3
15.6
15.1
15.1
12.4
12.4
11.7
11.6
11.5
11.0
10.7
10.6
10.3

City

2015
Population
(millions)

Tokyo
Bombay
Lagos
Shanghai
Jakarta
São Paulo
Karachi
Beijing
Dhaka
Mexico City
New York
Calcutta
Delhi
Tianjin
Manila

28.7
27.4
24.4
23.4
21.2
20.8
20.6
19.4
19.0
18.8
17.6
17.6
17.6
17.0
14.7

Sources: United Nations (1995), World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision. New
York: United Nations. Table 1. The World Resources Institute (1996), World Resources 1996–
97: The Urban Environment. New York: Oxford University Press. Table 1.1.

million. By 2015, cities in less-developed countries (LDCs) are anticipated
to comprise 13 of the 15 largest, with a combined population in excess of
261 million. Note in particular how Lagos, Nigeria, which does not even
appear on the list until occupying the fifteenth position in 1995, jumps to the
number three spot in 2015, as its population grows by more than 135 percent
during the 20-year period. In fact, if we focus solely on African urban areas
(as in Table 3), we find that the phenomenal growth of Lagos is the rule
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Table 3 African and regional urban growth rates, 1990–95, and percent
urban, 1975, 1995, and 2025
Urban growth rate
Country/region
Country
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambique
Nigeria
Tanzania
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Region
Africa
South America
Asia
Europe

Percent urban

1990–95 (percent)

1975

1995

2025

7.0
11.2
6.6
4.3
6.8
6.2
6.2
7.4
5.2
6.1
5.8
5.0

12
6
3
30
13
11
8
9
23
10
8
20

28
27
8
36
28
23
14
34
39
24
13
32

56
66
21
58
51
47
32
61
62
48
29
55

4.4
2.5
3.3
0.6

25
64
25
67

34
78
35
74

55
88
55
83

Source: The World Resources Institute (1996), World Resources 1996–97. New York: Oxford University Press. Data table A.1.

rather than the exception. Although their absolute numbers are lower than
many Asian and Latin American cities, African cities have uniformly higher
growth rates and more rapidly expanding numbers.
A central question related to the unprecedented size of these urban
agglomerations is how African cities will cope—economically, environmen-
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tally, and politically—with such acute concentrations of people. Whereas
cities offer the cost-reducing advantages of agglomeration economies and
economies of scale and proximity as well as numerous economic and social
externalities (for example, skilled workers, cheap transport, social and cultural amenities), the social costs of a progressive overloading of housing and
social services, not to mention increased crime, pollution, and congestion,
tend gradually to outweigh these historical urban advantages. Former World
Bank president Robert McNamara expressed his skepticism that huge urban
agglomerations could be made to work at all:
These sizes are such that any economies of location are dwarfed by
costs of congestion. The rapid population growth that has produced
them will have far outpaced the growth of human and physical
infrastructure needed for even moderately efficient economic life
and orderly political and social relationships, let alone amenity for
their residents.2
Along with the rapid spread of urbanization and the urban bias in development strategies has come the prolific growth of huge slums and
shantytowns. From the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and the pueblos jovenes of
Lima to the bustees of Calcutta and the bidonvilles of Dakar, such makeshift
communities have been doubling in size every five to ten years. Today slum
settlements represent more than one-third of the urban population in all developing countries; in many cases they account for 60 percent or more of the
urban total (as shown in Table 4). During the late 1980s, fully 72 of every
100 new households established in urban areas of developing countries were
located in shanties and slums. In Africa, the number was 92 out of every 100.

7

Table 4 Residents of slums and squatter settlements as a percentage of
urban population, by region and city
Slum dwellers as percentage
of city population

Region/city
Latin America
Bogotá, Colombia
Mexico City, Mexico
Caracas, Venezuela

60
46
42

Middle East and Africa
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Casablanca, Morocco
Ankara, Turkey
Cairo, Egypt
Kinshasa, Zaire

79
70
60
60
60

Asia
Calcutta, India
Manila, Philippines
Seoul, South Korea
Jakarta, Indonesia

67
35
29
26

Source: Population Crisis Committee (1983), World Population Growth and Global Security, Report No. 13.Washington, DC: Population Crisis Committee. Page 2.

Most of the settlements lack clean water, sewage systems, and electricity.
For example, metropolitan Cairo is attempting to cope with a population of
10 million people with a water and sanitation system built to serve 2 million.
Thirty percent of the population of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire lives without piped
water and 70 percent without sewers. Similar conditions can be found in
Nairobi, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Dakar, and Lagos where economic decline over the
past decade has led not only to falling incomes and rising unemployment but
also to a breakdown in urban services and rising social tensions.
8

Although population growth and accelerated rural-to-urban migration
are chiefly responsible for the expansion of urban shantytowns, part of the
blame rests with LDC governments. Their misguided policies regarding urban planning and their outmoded building codes often mean that 80 to 90
percent of new urban housing is “illegal.” For example, colonial-era building codes in Nairobi make building a house according to official standards
for less than US$3,500 impossible. The law also requires that every dwelling be accessible by car. As a result, two-thirds of Nairobi’s land is occupied
by 10 percent of the population, while 100,000 slum dwellings cannot be
improved legally. Similarly, in Manila, 88 percent of the population is too
poor to be able to buy or rent an officially “legal” house.3
In developing countries, the extent of government concern and even
alarm at the trends in urban population growth was vividly revealed in a
1988 UN report on population policies in the world.4 It showed that out of a
total of 158 countries, 73, all but five of which were developing nations,
considered the geographic distribution of their population “highly unacceptable.” Another 66 countries, 42 of them developing, considered their urban
population size “unacceptable to a degree.” Only six developing countries
considered their distribution acceptable. Almost all countries dissatisfied with
the size and growth of their urban population believed that internal rural–urban
migration was the dominant factor contributing to city growth. Statistics show
that rural migrants constitute roughly 35 to 65 percent of recorded urban population growth (see Table 5). Accordingly, 90 out of 116 developing countries responding to the UN survey indicated that they had initiated policies to slow or
reverse their accelerating trends in rural–urban migration.
Given this widespread dissatisfaction with rapid urban growth in Africa and other developing regions, the critical issue that must be addressed is
9

Table 5 Rural–urban migration as a percentage of urban population
growth, selected developing countries
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
India
Indonesia
Nigeria
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Thailand

Annual urban
growth

Share of growth due
to migration

2.0
4.5
4.9
3.8
4.7
7.0
4.8
4.3
7.5
5.3

35
36
43
45
49
64
42
61
64
45

Source: K. Newland (1980), City Limits: Emerging Constraints on Urban Growth,
Worldwatch Paper No. 38. Washington, DC: Worldwatch. Page 10.

the extent to which national governments can formulate development policies that can have a definite impact on trends in urban growth. Clearly, the
unquestioning pursuit of the orthodox development strategies of the past
few decades, with their emphasis on industrial modernization, technological
sophistication, and metropolitan growth, created a substantial geographic
imbalance in economic and noneconomic opportunities and contributed significantly to the steadily accelerating influx of rural migrants into urban areas. (Some noneconomic components of this urban–rural imbalance are vividly portrayed for Kenya in 1993 in Table 6.) Is it possible or even desirable
to attempt to reverse these trends now by pursuing a different set of population and development policies? With birthrates beginning to decline in some
African countries, the problem of rapid urban growth and accelerated rural–
urban migration undoubtedly will be one of the most important development
10

Table 6 Urban versus rural demographic and health characteristics, Kenya,
1993
Urban residents
(percent)

Rural residents
(percent)

Household population with no education
Female (6 years and older)
Male (6 years and older)

13.5
7.0

29.1
18.2

Household possessions and amenities
Radio
Television
Electricity
Drinking water piped to residence
Flush toilet

67.7
22.0
42.5
55.8
44.9

48.1
2.4
3.4
10.7
1.6

Health of children
Mortality rate of children under age 5a
Infant mortality ratea
Children 12 to 23 months with all vaccinations
Underweightb

75.4
45.5
80.9
12.8

95.6
64.9
78.3
23.5

92.9

88.8

97.6

94.5

77.6
3.4

39.2
5.8

Characteristic

Maternal health
Women receiving tetanus toxoid
during pregnancy
Women receiving prenatal care from a
health provider c
Women receiving delivery care from a
health provider c
Total fertility rate d
a

Deaths per 1,000 live births. Mortality rates by characteristics such as place of residence
are based on the last ten years prior to the survey in order to ensure sufficient sample size.
Mortality rates are based on a minimum of 500 live births.
b
Underweight is defined as the percentage of children whose height-for-age, weight-forage, weight-for-height z-score is below –2 standard deviations from the median of the International Reference Population (World Health Organization/Centers for Disease Control/
National Center for Health Statistics).
c
Doctor, nurse, or trained midwife.
d
Births per woman.
Source: Institute for Resource Development, Demographic and Health Survey Archive,
Columbia, MD.

11

and demographic issues of the early twenty-first century. Within urban areas, the growth and development of the informal sector as well as its role and
limitations for labor absorption and economic progress will assume increasing importance. A brief look at this unique component of African and other
developing cities is, therefore, in order.

THE URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR
A major focus of development theory has been on the dualistic nature
of developing countries’ national economies—the existence of a modern,
urban, capitalist sector geared toward capital-intensive, large-scale production and a traditional, rural, subsistence sector geared toward labor-intensive, small-scale production. In recent years, this dualistic analysis has also
been applied specifically to the urban economy, which has been decomposed
into a formal and an informal sector.
The existence of an unorganized, unregulated, and mostly legal but
unregistered informal sector was recognized in the early 1970s, following
observations in several African countries that massive additions to the urban
labor force failed to show up in formal modern-sector unemployment statistics. The bulk of new entrants into the urban labor force seemed to create
their own employment or to work for small-scale, family-owned enterprises.
The self-employed were engaged in a remarkable array of activities, ranging
from hawking, street vending, letter writing, knife sharpening, and junk collecting to selling fireworks, engaging in prostitution, drug peddling, and snake
charming. Others found jobs as mechanics, carpenters, small-scale artisans,
barbers, apprentices, and personal servants. Still others were highly successful small-scale entrepreneurs with several employees (mostly relatives) and
12

high incomes. Some eventually graduated to the formal sector, where they
become legally registered, licensed, and subject to government regulations.
Studies reveal that the share of the urban labor force engaged in informalsector activities ranges from 20 to 70 percent, the average being around 50
percent (see Table 7). Given the unprecedented rate of growth of the urban
population in developing countries that is expected to continue and the increasing failure of the rural and urban formal sectors to absorb additions to
the labor force, researchers are devoting more attention to the role of the informal sector in serving as a panacea for the growing unemployment problem.
The informal sector is characterized by a large number of small-scale
production and service activities that are individually or family owned and
use labor-intensive and simple technology. Such enterprises tend to be operated like monopolistically competitive firms with ease of entry, excess capacity, and competition driving profits (incomes) down to the average supply price of labor of potential new entrants. The usually self-employed workers
in this sector have little formal education, are generally unskilled, and lack
access to financial capital. As a result, worker productivity and income tend
to be lower in the informal sector than in the formal sector. Moreover, workers in the informal sector do not enjoy the measure of protection afforded by
the formal modern sector in terms of job security, decent working conditions, and old-age pensions. Most workers entering this sector are recent
migrants from rural areas unable to find employment in the formal sector.
Their motivation is usually to obtain sufficient income to survive, relying on
their own indigenous resources to create work. As many members of the
household as possible, including women and children, are involved in income-generating activities, and they often work very long hours. Most inhabit shacks that they have built themselves in slums and squatter settle13

Table 7 Estimated percentage of the urban labor force in the informal
sector in selected developing countries
Area

Percent

Africa
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire
Lagos, Nigeria
Kumasi, Ghana
Nairobi, Kenya
Urban areas, Senegal
Urban areas, Tunisia

31
50
60–70
44
50
34

Asia
Calcutta, India
Ahmedabad, India
Jakarta, Indonesia
Colombo, Sri Lanka
Urban areas, western Malaysia
Singapore
Urban areas, Thailand
Urban areas, Pakistan

40–50
47
45
19
35
23
26
69

Latin America
Córdoba, Argentina
São Paulo, Brazil
Urban areas, Brazil
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Urban areas, Chile
Bogotá, Colombia
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Guayaquil, Ecuador
Quito, Ecuador
San Salvador, El Salvador
Federal District and State of Mexico
Mexico, D.F., Guadalajara, and Monterey
Asunción, Paraguay
Urban areas, Peru
Urban areas, Venezuela
Caracas, Venezuela
Kingston, Jamaica

38
43
30
24
31
39
43
50
48
48
41
27
42
57
60
44
40
33

Source: S.U. Sethuraman (1981), The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
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ments generally lacking minimal public services. Others are less fortunate.
Many millions are homeless, living on the pavements of Calcutta, Manila,
Dakar, Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá, and many other third world cities.
They find sporadic, temporary employment in the informal sector as day
laborers and hawkers, but their incomes are insufficient to provide even the
most rudimentary shelter.
In terms of its relationship to other sectors, the informal sector is linked
with the rural sector in that it allows unskilled laborers to escape from rural
poverty and underemployment, although it grants them living and working
conditions and incomes that are not much better than what they had had
before moving. It is closely connected with the formal urban sector: The
formal sector depends on the informal sector for cheap inputs and wage goods
for its workers, and the informal sector, in turn, depends on the growth of the
formal sector for a good portion of its income and clientele. The informal
sector also often subsidizes the formal sector by providing raw materials and
basic commodities for its workers at artificially low prices maintained through
the formal sector’s economic power and legitimacy granted by the government.
The important role that the informal sector plays in providing income
opportunities for the poor is no longer open to debate. The question remains,
however, as to whether the informal sector is merely a holding ground for
people awaiting entry into the formal sector and, as such, is a transitional
phase that must be made as comfortable as possible until it is absorbed by the
formal sector, or whether it is here to stay and should, in fact, be promoted as a
major source of employment and income for the urban labor force.5
A good argument can be made in support of the latter view. The formal
sector in developing countries has a small base in terms of output and em-
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ployment. In order to absorb future additions to the urban labor force, the
formal sector must be able to generate employment at the high rate of at least
10 percent per annum, according to estimates made by the International
Labour Organization (ILO). This requirement means that output must grow
at an even faster rate, because employment in this sector increases less than
proportionately in relation to output. This sort of growth seems highly unlikely to occur in view of current trends. Thus the burden on the informal
sector to absorb more labor will continue to increase unless other solutions
to the urban unemployment problem are provided. Moreover, the informal
sector has demonstrated its ability to generate employment and income for
the urban labor force. As noted above, it is already absorbing an average of
50 percent of the urban labor force. Some studies have shown the informal
sector to be generating almost one-third of urban income.
Eight other arguments can be made in favor of promoting the informal
sector. First, scattered evidence indicates that the informal sector generates
surplus even under the currently hostile policy environment, which denies it
access to the advantages offered to the formal sector, such as the availability
of credit, foreign exchange, and tax concessions. Thus the informal sector’s
surplus could provide an impetus to growth in the urban economy. Second,
as a result of its low capital intensity, only a fraction of the capital needed in
the formal sector is required to employ a worker in the informal sector, offering considerable savings to developing countries so often plagued with capital shortages. Third, by providing access to training and apprenticeships at
substantially lower costs than that provided by formal institutions and the
formal sector, the informal sector can play an important role in the formation
of human capital. Fourth, the informal sector generates demand for semi-
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skilled and unskilled labor, the supply of which is increasing in both relative
and absolute terms and which is unlikely to be absorbed by the formal sector
with its growing demands for a skilled labor force. Fifth, the informal sector
is more likely to adopt appropriate technologies and make use of local resources, allowing for a more efficient allocation of resources. Sixth, the informal sector plays an important role in recycling waste materials, engaging
in the collection of goods ranging from scrap metals to cigarette butts, many
of which find their way to the industrial sector or provide basic commodities
for the poor. Seventh, promotion of the informal sector would ensure an
increased distribution of the benefits of development to the poor, many of
whom are concentrated there. Finally, and perhaps most important, the informal sector provides a major source of income and employment for women,
many of whom are heads of households and who have been displaced by
agricultural mechanization.
Promotion of the informal sector is not, however, without its disadvantages. One major disadvantage lies in the strong relationship between
rural–urban migration and labor absorption in the informal sector. Migrants
from the rural sector have both a lower unemployment rate and a shorter
waiting period before obtaining a job in the informal than in the formal sector. Promoting income and employment opportunities in the informal sector
could, therefore, aggravate the urban unemployment problem by attracting
more labor than either the informal or the formal sector could absorb. Furthermore, concern exists over the environmental consequences of a highly
concentrated informal sector in the urban areas. Many informal-sector activities cause pollution and congestion (for example, pedicabs) or inconvenience to pedestrians (for example, hawkers and vendors). Moreover, in-
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creased densities in slums and low-income neighborhoods, coupled with poor
urban services, could cause enormous health and environmental problems
for urban areas. Any policy measures designed to promote the informal sector must incorporate means of coping with these various issues.
Limited discussion has appeared in the literature about what sorts of
measures might be adopted to promote the informal sector. The ILO has
made some general suggestions. At the start, governments will have to dispense with their currently hostile attitudes toward the informal sector and
maintain a more positive and sympathetic posture. For example, in Latin
America, bureaucratic red tape and an inordinate number of administrative
procedures required for registering a new business typically result in delays
of up to 240 days in Ecuador, 310 days in Venezuela, and 525 days in Guatemala. Brazil, Mexico, and Chile all require more than 20 applications before
a company can be approved for conducting business. These procedures not
only cause excessive delays but also can inflate the costs of doing business
by as much as 70 percent annually. Many informal-sector businesses simply
skirt the law.
Because access to skills plays an important role in determining the
structure of the informal sector, governments should facilitate training in the
areas that are most beneficial to the urban economy. In this way, the government can play a role in shaping the informal sector so that it contains production and service activities that provide the most value to society. Specifically, such measures might promote legal activities, and discourage illegal
ones, by providing proper skills and other incentives. They could also generate taxes that now go unpaid.
The lack of capital is a major constraint on activities in the informal
sector. The provision of credit would, therefore, permit these enterprises to
18

expand, produce more profit, and generate more income and employment.
Access to improved technology would have similar effects. Providing infrastructure and suitable locations for work (for example, designating specific
areas for vendors’ stalls) could help alleviate some of the environmental
consequences of an expanded informal sector. Most important, improved
living conditions must be provided, if not directly, then by promoting growth
of the sector on the fringes of urban areas or in smaller towns where the
population will settle close to its new area of work, away from urban density.
Promotion of the informal sector outside the urban areas may also help redirect the flow of rural–urban migration, especially if it is carried out in conjunction with the policies discussed below.

WOMEN IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR
In some regions of the world, women predominate among rural–urban
migrants and may even comprise the majority of the urban population. Although historically, many of these women were simply accompanying their
spouses, a growing number of unmarried African women migrate to seek
economic opportunity. Few of these migrants are able to find employment
in the formal sector, which is dominated by men. As a consequence, women
often represent the bulk of the informal-sector labor supply, working for low
wages at unstable jobs with no employee or social security benefits. The
increase in the number of single female migrants has also contributed to the
rising proportion of urban households headed by women, which tend to be
poorer, experience tighter resource constraints, and retain high fertility rates.
The changing composition of migration flows has important economic and
demographic implications for many urban areas of developing countries.
19

Because members of female-headed households are generally restricted
to low-productivity, informal-sector employment and experience higher dependency burdens, they are more likely to be poor and malnourished and
less likely to obtain formal education, health care, or clean water and sanitation. Among the Brazilian poor, for example, male-headed households are
four times more likely than female-headed households to have access to government-sponsored health services. School dropout rates among children from
households headed by women are much higher, because children are more
likely to be working to contribute to household income.
Many women run small business ventures, called microenterprises,
that require little or no start-up capital and usually involve the marketing of
homemade foodstuffs and handicrafts. Although women’s restricted access
to capital leads to high rates of return on their tiny investments, the extremely
low capital–labor ratios confine women to low-productivity undertakings.
Studies in Latin America and Asia have found that where credit is available
to women working in informal-sector microenterprises, repayment rates have
been as high as or higher than those for men. Because women are able to
make more productive use of capital, their rates of return on investments
often exceed those for men.
Despite the impressive record of these credit programs, few exist in
Africa. The vast majority of institutional credit is channeled through formalsector agencies, and, as a result, African women generally find themselves
ineligible for small loans. Government programs to enhance income in poor
households will inevitably neglect the neediest households so long as they
continue to focus on the formal-sector employment of men and the allocation of resources through formal-sector institutions. To solve the plight of
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poor urban women and their children, efforts must be made to integrate women
into the economic mainstream. Ensuring that women benefit from development programs will require that women’s special circumstances be considered in policy design.
The legalization and economic promotion of informal-sector activities, where the majority of the urban female labor force is employed, could
greatly improve women’s financial flexibility and the productivity of their
ventures. However, to enable women to reap these benefits, African governments must repeal laws that restrict women’s right to own property, to conduct financial transactions, or to limit their fertility. Likewise, barriers to
women’s direct involvement in technical training programs and extension
services must be eradicated. Finally, the provision of affordable child care
and family planning services would lighten the burden of African women’s reproductive roles and permit them a greater degree of economic participation.
URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN AFRICA
As we have seen, one of the major consequences of the rapid urbanization process has been the burgeoning supply of job seekers in both the modern (formal) and traditional (informal) sectors of the urban economy. In most
African countries, the supply of workers far exceeds the demand, the result
being extremely high rates of unemployment and underemployment in urban areas. Table 8 provides some detailed data on urban unemployment for
12 African countries. Note that the table focuses solely on rates of open
unemployment. Thus, it excludes the many more people who are chronically
underemployed in the informal sector. The problem is, therefore, much more
serious than even these data suggest. Also, because these statistics are from
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Table 8 Rates of urban and rural unemployment as a percentage of the
active population in Africa, by country and year
Unemployment
Country

Year

Algeria
Benin
Burundi
Cameroon

1966
1968
1963
1962
1964
1963
1960
1970
1968–69
1968–69
1960
1963
1967
1965
1971
1967

Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana
Kenya
Morocco
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Zaire

Area
Urban areas
Urban areas
Capital city
Largest city
Capital city
Capital city
Large towns
Two large cities
Capital city
Second-largest city
Urban areas
Urban areas
Capital city
Urban areas
Seven towns
Capital city

Urban

Rural

26.6
13.0a
18.7a
13.0a
17.0a
15.0a
12.0
9.0
10.0a
14.0a
20.5
12.6
15.0
7.0
5.0a
12.9

na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
5.4
na
na
3.9
na
na

a
na = Data not available.
Men only.
Source: Paul Bairoch (1973), Urban Unemployment in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1973. Page 49. Josef Gugler (1976), Internal Migration:
The New World and the Third World. Eds. A. Richmond and D. Kubat. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage, 1976. Page 185.

the 1960s (more recent detailed data for these countries are nearly nonexistent), they are likely to show unemployment rates considerably below current levels (but see Table 9 for some 1980s data), because the sharp economic decline of the 1980s substantially increased urban unemployment and
underemployment.6 Nevertheless, Table 8 indicates that even in the 1960s,
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Table 9 Percentage of open urban unemployment in four African countries
Country

Year

Average unemployed

Botswana
Kenya
Liberia
Tanzania

1985
1986
1984
1984

31
16
13
22

Source: International Labour Organization (1989), World Labour Report, 1989. Geneva:
International Labour Organization. Tables 1.7 and 1.12.

before the labor-force explosion and economic free-fall of the 1980s, African cities had very high rates of open urban unemployment. If scattered information on the substantial numbers of the urban labor force who were
underemployed in part-time, informal-sector service activities had been included, the overall figures for urban surplus labor (both openly unemployed
and underemployed) would have exceeded 30 percent in most countries.
Moreover, had the focus here been on residents in the 15–24 age bracket (the
majority of whom are recent migrants), the rate typically would have exceeded 50 percent. Because a major contributing factor to both high rates of
urban growth and high rates of unemployment is rural–urban migration, investigating this critical issue in some detail is essential.
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
For many years, rural–urban migration was viewed favorably in the
economic development literature. Internal migration was thought to be a
natural process in which surplus labor was gradually withdrawn from the
rural sector to provide needed manpower for urban industrial growth. The
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process was deemed socially beneficial because human resources were being shifted from locations where their social marginal product was often
assumed to be zero to places where this marginal product was not only positive but also rapidly growing as a result of capital accumulation and technological progress. This process was formalized in the Lewis theory of development. However, as Richard Jolly noted in 1970:
Far from being concerned with measures to stem the flow, the
major interest of these economists (i.e., those who stressed the
importance of labor transfer) was with policies that would release labor to increase the flow. Indeed, one of the reasons given
for trying to increase productivity in the agricultural sector was to
release sufficient labor for urban industrialization. How irrelevant
most of this concern looks today.7
In contrast to the promigration viewpoint, three decades of African
experience has made clear that rates of rural–urban migration have greatly
exceeded rates of urban job creation and swamped the absorptive capacity of
both formal-sector industry and urban social services. Migration can no longer
be casually viewed by economists as a beneficent process necessary to solve
problems of growing urban labor demand. On the contrary, migration today
remains a major factor contributing to the phenomenon of urban surplus
labor; a force that continues to exacerbate already serious urban unemployment problems caused by the growing economic and structural imbalances
between African urban and rural areas.
Migration exacerbates these rural–urban structural imbalances in two
direct ways. First, on the supply side, internal migration disproportionately
increases the growth rate of urban job seekers relative to urban population
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growth, which itself stands at historically unprecedented levels, because of
the high proportion of well-educated young people in the migrant system.
Their presence tends to swell the urban labor supply while depleting the
rural countryside of valuable human capital. Second, on the demand side,
urban job creation is generally more difficult to accomplish than rural job
creation because of the need for substantial complementary resource inputs
for most jobs in the industrial sector. Moreover, the pressures of rising urban
wages and compulsory employee fringe benefits in combination with the
unavailability of appropriate, more labor-intensive production technologies
means that a rising share of modern-sector output growth is accounted for by
increases in labor productivity. Together this rapid supply increase and lagging demand (what many now refer to as “jobless growth”) tend to convert a
short-run problem of resource imbalances into a long-run situation of chronic
and rising urban surplus labor.
The impact of migration on the African development process is much
more pervasive than its obvious exacerbation of urban unemployment and
underemployment. In fact, the significance of the migration phenomenon
throughout much of Africa lies not necessarily in the process itself or even in
its impact on the sectoral allocation of human resources. Rather, its significance lies in its implications for economic growth in general and for the
character of that growth, particularly in its distributional manifestations.
Migration in excess of job opportunities is both a symptom of and a
contributor to African underdevelopment. Understanding the causes, determinants, and consequences of internal rural–urban labor migration is thus
central to understanding the nature and character of the development process and to formulating policies to influence this process in socially desirable ways.
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A simple yet crucial step in underlining the centrality of the migration
phenomenon is to recognize that any economic and social policy that affects
rural and urban real incomes will influence the migration process directly or
indirectly. This process will, in turn, tend to alter the pattern of sectoral and
geographic economic activity, income distribution, and even population
growth. Because all economic policies have direct and indirect effects on the
level and growth of either urban or rural incomes or of both, they all will
have a tendency to influence the nature and magnitude of the migration stream.
Although some policies may have a more direct and immediate impact (for
example, wages and employment-promotion programs), many others, even
though less obvious, may in the long run be no less important. These policies, for example, would include land-tenure arrangements; commodity pricing; credit allocation; taxation; export promotion; import substitution; commercial and exchange-rate policies; the geographic distribution of social
services; public-investment programs; dealings with private foreign investors; population and family planning programs; the structure, content, and
orientation of the educational system; the functioning of labor markets; and
international technology transfer and the location of new industries.
Recognition of the central importance of rural–urban migration is
clearly necessary, as is integration of the two-way relationship between migration and population distribution on the one hand and economic variables
on the other into a more comprehensive framework designed to improve
development-policy formulation. In addition, we need to understand better
not only why people move and what factors are most important in their
decisionmaking process but also what the consequences of migration are for
rural and urban economic and social development. If all development poli-
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cies affect migration and are affected by it, which are the most significant,
and why? What are the policy options and trade-offs among different and
sometimes competing objectives (for example, curtailing internal migration
and expanding educational opportunities in rural areas)?
INTERNAL MIGRATION IN AFRICA
An understanding of the causes and determinants of rural–urban migration and the relationship between migration and relative economic opportunities in urban and rural areas is central to any analysis of African employment problems. Because migrants comprise a significant proportion of
the urban labor force in most African nations, the magnitude of rural–urban
migration has been and will continue to be a principal determinant of the
supply of new job seekers. Therefore, the migration process must be understood before the nature and causes of urban unemployment can be comprehended. Government policies intended to ameliorate the urban unemployment problem must be based, in the first instance, on knowledge of who
comes to town and why.
The migration process
The factors influencing the decision to migrate are varied and complex. Because migration is a selective process affecting individuals with certain economic, social, educational, and demographic characteristics, the relative influence of economic and noneconomic factors may vary not only
between nations and regions but also within defined geographic areas and
populations. Much of the early research on migration tended to focus on
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social, cultural, and psychological factors while recognizing, but not evaluating carefully, the importance of economic variables. Emphasis has been
placed on five broad areas: (1) social factors, including the desire of migrants to break away from traditional constraints of social or kinship affiliations; (2) physical factors, including climate and meteorological disasters
like floods and droughts, as well as wars and rural violence; (3) demographic
factors, including reduction in mortality rates and concomitant high rates of
rural population growth; (4) cultural factors, including the security of African urban extended-family relationships and the allure of modern urban
amenities; (5) communication factors, including improved transportation,
urban-oriented educational systems, and the modernizing impact of radio,
television, and cinema.
All these noneconomic factors are, of course, relevant. However, widespread agreement now exists among economists and noneconomists that rural–urban migration can be explained primarily as the result of economic
factors. These include not only the standard push from subsistence agriculture and the pull of relatively high urban wages but also the potential push
back toward rural areas as a result of high urban unemployment.
Migrant characteristics
The main characteristics of migrants are conveniently divided into three
broad categories: demographic, educational, and economic.
Demographic characteristics. Urban migrants in developing countries
tend to be young men and women between the ages of 15 and 24. Various
studies in Africa and Asia have provided quantitative evidence of this phenomenon in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, India, Thailand, South Ko-
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rea, and the Philippines. In recent years, the proportion of migrating women
has increased as their educational opportunities have expanded. This increase,
substantial in many countries, has been particularly evident in Latin America,
Southeast Asia, and West Africa. In fact, women now constitute the majority
of the migration stream in Latin America, largely as a result of the region’s
relatively advanced state of urbanization compared with other developing
regions.8 Basically, there are two types of female migration: the “associational” migration of wives and daughters accompanying the “primary” male
migrant, and the migration of unattached women. The latter type of migration is increasing most rapidly in Africa.
Educational characteristics. One of the most consistent findings of
rural–urban migration studies is the positive correlation between educational
attainment and migration. A clear association is found between the level of
completed education and the propensity to migrate: People with more years
of schooling, everything else being equal, are more likely to migrate than
those with less schooling. In a comprehensive study of migration in Tanzania by Barnum and Sabot, for example, the relationship between education
and migration was clearly documented, especially in terms of the impact of
declining urban employment opportunities on the educational characteristics of migrants.9 Secondary-school dropouts were found to constitute a rising proportion of the migration stream. The explanation that Barnum and
Sabot offered was that limited urban employment opportunities were being
rationed by educational levels, and only workers with at least some secondary education had a chance of finding a job. Those with only a primaryschool education were finding it difficult to secure employment, and hence
their proportionate numbers in the migrant stream began to decline.
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Economic characteristics. For many years, the largest proportion of
urban migrants were poor, landless, and unskilled individuals whose rural
opportunities were, for the most part, nonexistent. In colonial Africa, seasonal migration was predominant, with migrants from various income levels
seeking short-term urban jobs. Recently, however, with the emergence of a
stabilized, modern industrial sector in most African urban areas, the situation has changed. Migrants, both male and female, seem to come from all
socioeconomic strata, with the majority of them being very poor only because
most rural inhabitants are poor.
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF AFRICAN RURAL–URBAN
MIGRATION
Historically, the economic development of Western Europe and the
United States was closely associated with, and in fact defined in terms of,
the movement of labor from rural to urban areas. For the most part, with a
rural sector dominated by agricultural activities and an urban sector focusing on industrialization, overall economic development in these countries
was characterized by the gradual reallocation, both internal and international,
of labor from agriculture into industry through rural–urban migration. Urbanization and industrialization were essentially synonymous. This historical model served as a blueprint for developing nations, as evidenced, for
example, by the original Lewis theory of labor transfer.
However, the overwhelming evidence of the past few decades, when
developing nations in general and African countries in particular witnessed a
massive migration of their rural populations into urban areas despite rising
levels of urban unemployment and underemployment, lessens the validity of
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the Lewis two-sector model of development.10 An explanation of the phenomenon, as well as policies to address the resulting problems, must be sought
elsewhere. In a series of articles published during the past two decades the
author has developed a theory of rural–urban migration (the Todaro migration model) to explain the apparently paradoxical relationship of accelerated
rural–urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment.11
Starting from the assumption that migration is primarily an economic
phenomenon, which for the individual migrant can be a rational decision to
make despite the existence of urban unemployment, this model postulates
that migration proceeds in response to urban–rural differences in expected
income rather than actual earnings. The fundamental premise is that migrants
and their families consider the various labor-market opportunities available
to them in the rural and urban sectors and choose the one that maximizes
their expected gains from migration. Expected gains are measured by the
difference in real incomes between rural and urban work and the probability
of a new migrant’s obtaining an urban job. A schematic framework showing
how the varying factors interact to affect the migration decision in Africa is
given in Figure 2.
In essence, the theory assumes that members of the labor force, both
actual and potential, compare their expected incomes for a given time horizon in the urban sector (the difference between returns and costs of migration) with prevailing average rural incomes and migrate if the former exceeds the latter.
Consider the following illustration. Suppose that the average unskilled
or semiskilled rural worker has a choice between working his own or some
else’s land for an annual average real income of, say, 50 units and migrating
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Figure 2
Africa

Schematic framework for analyzing the migration decision in
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Source: Derek Byerlee (1974), “Rural–urban migration in Africa: Theory, policy, and research implications,” International Migration Review 3: 553.

to the city, where, with his skill and educational background, he might obtain wage employment yielding an annual real income of 100 units. The
more commonly used economic models of migration, which place exclusive
emphasis on the income-differential factor as the determinant of the decision to migrate, would indicate a clear choice in this situation. The worker
should seek the higher-paying urban job. However, these migration models
were developed largely in the context of advanced industrial economies and,
therefore, implicitly assume the existence of full or nearly full employment.
In a full-employment environment, the decision to migrate can be based
solely on the desire to secure the highest-paid job wherever it becomes available. Simple economic theory would indicate that such migration should
lead to a reduction in wage differentials through the interaction of the forces
of supply and demand, in areas of both emigration and immigration.
Unfortunately, such an analysis is not realistic in the context of the
institutional and economic framework of most African nations. First, these
countries are beset by a chronic unemployment problem, so that a typical
migrant cannot expect to secure a high-paying urban job immediately. In
fact, on entering the urban labor market, many uneducated, unskilled migrants are more likely to become totally unemployed or be forced to seek
casual and part-time employment as vendors, hawkers, repairmen, and itinerant day laborers in the traditional (informal) sector, where ease of entry,
small scale of operation, and relatively competitive price and wage determination prevail. In the case of migrants with considerable human capital in
the form of a secondary or university certificate, opportunities are much better, and many will find formal-sector jobs relatively quickly. But these individuals constitute only a small proportion of the total migration stream. Consequently, in deciding to migrate, the probabilities and risks of being
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unemployed or underemployed for a considerable period of time must be balanced against the positive urban–rural real income differential. That a typical
African migrant can expect to earn twice as great an annual real income in an
urban area as he can in a rural environment may be of little consequence if the
probability of his securing the higher-paying job within, for example, a oneyear period is one chance in five. Thus, the probability of his being successful in securing the higher-paying urban job is 20 percent, and, therefore, his
expected urban income for the one-year period is in fact 20 units, not the 100
units that an urban worker in a full-employment environment would expect
to receive. So, with a one-period time horizon and a probability of success of
20 percent, the decision to seek an urban job would be irrational, even though
the differential between his urban and rural earning capacity is 100 percent.
However, if his probability of success were 60 percent and his expected
urban income, therefore, were 60 units, the migrant would be entirely rational within his one-period time horizon to try his luck in the urban area, even
though urban unemployment may be extremely high.
If we approach the situation by assuming a considerably longer time
horizon—a more realistic assumption because the vast majority of migrants
are between the ages of 15 and 24—the decision to migrate should be represented on the basis of a longer-term, more permanent income calculation. If
the migrant anticipates a relatively low probability of finding regular-wage
employment in the initial period, but expects this probability to increase
over time as he is able to broaden his urban contacts, his decision to migrate
would still be rational, even though his expected urban income during the initial
period or periods might be lower than his expected rural income. As long as the
present value of the net stream of expected urban income over the migrant’s
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planning horizon exceeds that of his expected rural income, the decision to migrate is justifiable. This, in essence, is the process portrayed in the figure.
Rather than equalizing urban and rural wage rates, as would be the
case in a competitive model, we see that rural–urban migration in this model
acts as an equilibrating force that equates rural and urban expected incomes.
For example, if average rural income is 60 units and urban income is 120
units, a 50 percent urban unemployment rate would be necessary before further migration would no longer be profitable. Because expected incomes are
defined in terms of both wages and employment probabilities, continued
migration can be profitable despite the existence of sizable rates of urban unemployment. In this example, migration would continue even if the urban unemployment rate were 30 to 40 percent. Conversely, if the urban–rural wage gap
declines, migration could continue to accelerate if the urban unemployment rate
also declines.

A diagrammatic presentation
This process of achieving an unemployment equilibrium between urban expected wages and average rural income rather than an equalized rural–
urban wage as in the traditional neoclassical free-market model can also be
explained by a diagrammatic portrayal of the basic Todaro model, as shown
in Figure 3.12 Assume only two sectors, rural agriculture and manufacturing.
The demand for labor (the marginal product of labor curve) in agriculture is
given by the negatively sloped line AA’. Labor demand in manufacturing is
given by MM’ (reading from right to left). The total labor force is given by
line OAOM . In a neoclassical, flexible-wage, full- employment market economy,
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the equilibrium wage would be established at WA* = WM* , with OA L*A workers in
agriculture and OM L*M workers employed in urban manufacturing. All available workers are therefore employed.
But what if urban wages are institutionally determined at a level W M ,
which is at a considerable distance above WA* ?13 The validity of this assumption was recently confirmed in a careful econometric study of urban formalsector wage determination in Ghana.14 If, for the moment, we continue to
assume that there is no unemployment, OM LM workers would obtain urban
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jobs, and the rest, OA LM , would have to settle for rural employment at OAWA**
wages (below the free-market level of OAWA* ). Now we have an urban–rural
real wage gap of W M − WA** , with W M institutionally fixed. If rural workers
were free to migrate (as they are almost everywhere except in parts of China),
then despite the availability of only OM LM jobs, they are willing to take their
chances in the urban job lottery. If their chance (probability) of securing one
of these favored jobs is expressed by the ratio of employment in manufacturing, LM, to the total urban labor pool, LUS, then the expression
WA =

LM
(WM )
LUS

shows the probability of urban job success necessary to equate agricultural
income WA with expected urban income ( LM / LUS )(W M ) , thus causing a potential migrant to be indifferent to job locations. The locus of such points of
indifference is given by the qq’ curve in the figure.15 The new unemployment
equilibrium now occurs at point Z, where the actual urban–rural wage gap is
W M − WA , OA LA workers are still in the agricultural sector, and OM LM of these
workers have modern (formal)-sector jobs paying W M wages.

The rest LUS = OMLA – OMLM are either unemployed or engaged in lowincome, informal-sector activities. This explains the existence of urban unemployment and the private economic rationality of continued rural–urban
migration despite high unemployment. However, although migrating to the
city may be rational from a cost–benefit perspective for an individual despite high urban unemployment, it can, as we shall soon discover, be very
costly socially. Finally, if instead of assuming that all urban migrants are the
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same, we incorporate the reality of different levels of human capital (education), we can understand why a higher proportion of the rural educated migrate than do the uneducated—because they have a better chance (a higher
probability) of earning higher urban wages than do unskilled migrants.
To sum up, the Todaro migration model has four basic characteristics:
1 Migration is stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs.
2 The decision to migrate depends on expected rather than actual
urban–rural real wage differentials, where the expected differential is determined by the interaction of two variables, the actual
urban–rural wage differential and the probability of obtaining employment in the urban sector.
3 The probability of obtaining an urban job is directly related to the
urban employment rate and is thus inversely related to the urban
unemployment rate.
4 Migration rates in excess of job-opportunity growth rates are not
only possible but also rational and even likely in the face of wide
urban–rural expected-income differentials. High rates of urban
unemployment are, therefore, inevitable outcomes of the serious
imbalance of economic opportunities between urban and rural areas in most African countries.
Policy implications
Although this theory might, at first, seem to devalue the critical importance of rural–urban migration by portraying it as an adjustment mechanism
by which workers allocate themselves between rural and urban labor mar-
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kets, it does have important policy implications for African development
strategy with regard to wages and incomes, rural development, and industrialization.
First, imbalances in urban–rural employment opportunities caused by
the urban bias of many African development strategies must be reduced.
Because migrants are assumed to respond to differentials in expected incomes, it is vitally important that imbalances between economic opportunities in rural and urban sectors be minimalized. Permitting real urban wage
rates to rise at a greater pace than average rural incomes (or, indeed, to fall,
as in the 1980s, at a slower pace) will stimulate further rural–urban migration in spite of rising levels of urban unemployment. This heavy influx of
people into urban areas not only gives rise to socioeconomic problems in the
cities but eventually may also create problems of labor shortages in rural
areas, especially during the busy seasons. These social costs of migration
may exceed its benefits to individuals.
Second, urban job creation is an insufficient solution for the urban
unemployment problem. The traditional (Keynesian) economic solution to
urban unemployment (the creation of more urban modern-sector jobs without simultaneous attempts to improve rural incomes and employment opportunities) can result in the paradoxical situation in which more urban employment leads to higher levels of urban unemployment. Once again, the
imbalance in expected income-earning opportunities is the crucial concept.
Because migration rates are assumed to respond positively to both higher
urban wages and higher urban employment opportunities (or probabilities),
it follows that for any given positive urban–rural wage differential (in most
of Africa, urban wages are three to four times greater than rural wages),
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higher urban employment rates will widen the expected differential and induce even higher rates of rural–urban migration. For every new job created,
two or three migrants who were productively occupied in rural areas may
come to the city. Thus, if 100 new jobs are created, as many as 300 new
migrants may seek them and, therefore, 200 more urban dwellers will be
unemployed. A policy designed to reduce urban unemployment may lead
not only to higher levels of urban unemployment but also to lower levels of
agricultural output as a result of induced migration.
Third, indiscriminate educational expansion will lead to further migration and unemployment. The Todaro model thus has important (and unconventional) policy implications for curtailing investment in excessive educational expansion, especially at the higher levels. The heavy influx of rural
migrants into urban areas at rates much in excess of new employment opportunities has necessitated a rationing device in the selection of new employees. Although within each educational group such selection may be largely
random, many observers have noted that employers tend to use the number
of years of completed schooling as the typical rationing device. For the same
wage, they will hire people with more education in preference to those with
less, even though higher education may not contribute to better job performance. Formerly, those with a primary education could hold jobs as sweepers, messengers, filing clerks, and the like, whereas now such jobs require
secondary training; those jobs formerly requiring a secondary certificate (positions for clerks, typists, bookkeepers, and the like) now require a university degree. Therefore, for any given urban wage, if the probability of success in securing a modern-sector job is higher for people with more education,
their expected-income differential will also be higher, and they will be more
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likely to migrate to the cities. Thus, the basic Todaro model provides an
economic rationale for the observation that in most less-developed countries, rural inhabitants with more education are more likely to migrate than
are those with less.
From the viewpoint of educational policy, the prediction is safe that as
job opportunities become scarce in relation to the number of applicants, students will experience increasing pressure to proceed farther up the educational ladder. The private demand for education, which in many ways is a
derived demand for urban jobs, will continue to exert tremendous pressure
on African governments to invest in postprimary school facilities. But for
many of these students, the specter of joining the ranks of the educated unemployed becomes more of a reality with each passing year. Government
overinvestment in postprimary educational facilities often turns out to be an
investment in idle human resources.
Fourth, wage subsidies and traditional scarcity-factor pricing can be
counterproductive. A standard economic policy prescription for generating
urban employment opportunities is to eliminate factor-price distortions by
using “correct” prices, perhaps implemented by wage subsidies (fixed government subsidies to employers for each worker employed) or direct government hiring. Because actual urban wages generally exceed the market or
“correct” wage as a result of a variety of institutional factors, the argument is
often made that the elimination of wage distortions through market-price
adjustments or a subsidy system will encourage more labor-intensive modes
of production. Although such policies can do this, they can also lead to higher
levels of unemployment in accordance with the argument advanced here
about induced migration. The overall welfare impact of a wage-subsidy policy
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when both the rural and urban sectors are taken into account is not immediately clear. Much will depend on the level of urban unemployment, the size
of the urban–rural expected-income differential, and the employment elasticity of induced migration as more urban jobs are created.16
Finally, programs of integrated rural development should be encouraged. Policies that operate only on the demand side of the urban employment picture, such as wage subsidies, direct government hiring, elimination
of factor-pricing distortions, and employer tax incentives, are probably far
less effective in the long run in alleviating the unemployment problem than
are policies designed directly to regulate the supply of labor to urban areas.
Clearly, however, some combination of both kinds of policies is most desirable.
Policies of rural development are crucial to this aim. Many informed
observers agree on the central importance of African rural and agricultural
development to the solution of the urban unemployment problem. Most proposals call for the restoration of a proper balance between rural and urban
incomes and for changes in government policies that currently give development programs a strong bias toward the urban industrial sector (for example,
policies for the provision of health, education, and social services).
Given the prevailing urban bias and thus the political difficulties of
reducing urban–rural real-wage differentials, the need to expand urban employment opportunities continuously through judicious investments in smalland medium-scale labor-intensive industries, and given the inevitable growth
of the urban industrial sector, every effort must be made to broaden the economic base of the rural economy. The present unnecessary economic incentives for rural–urban migration must be minimized through creative and welldesigned programs of integrated rural development. These should focus on

42

both farm and nonfarm income generation, employment growth, delivery of
health-care services, educational improvement, infrastructure development
(electricity, water, roads, and so forth), and the provision of other rural amenities. Successful rural development programs adapted to the socioeconomic
and environmental needs of diverse African countries seem to offer the only
viable long-run solution to the problem of excessive rural–urban migration.
To assert, however, that an urgent need exists for policies designed to
curb the excessive influx of rural migrants is not to imply an attempt to
reverse what some observers have called inevitable historical trends. Rather,
the implication of the Todaro migration model is that a growing need exists
for a policy package that does not exacerbate these historical trends toward
urbanization by artificially creating serious imbalances in economic opportunities between urban and rural areas.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this essay, we have looked at possible policy approaches designed
to improve the serious migration and employment situation in African countries. In conclusion, a summary is presented below of what appears to be the
growing consensus of most economists on the shape of a comprehensive
migration and employment strategy.17 This consensus has six key elements:
1 Creating an appropriate rural–urban economic balance. A more
appropriate balance between rural and urban economic and noneconomic opportunities appears to be indispensable to ameliorating urban and rural unemployment problems and to slowing the
pace of rural–urban migration. The main thrust of this activity
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should lie in the integrated development of the rural sector, the
spread of small-scale industries throughout the countryside, and
the reorientation of economic activity and social investments toward rural areas.
2 Expansion of small-scale, labor-intensive industries. The composition or “product mix” of output has obvious effects on the magnitude (and, in many cases, the location) of employment opportunities, because some products (often basic consumer goods) require
more labor per unit of output and per unit of capital than do others.
Expansion of these mostly small-scale and labor-intensive industries in both urban and rural areas can be accomplished in two
ways: directly, through government investment and incentives, particularly for activities in the urban informal sector; and indirectly,
through income redistribution (either directly or from future
growth) to the rural poor, whose structure of consumer demand is
both less import-intensive and more labor-intensive than that of
the better-off.
3 Elimination of factor-price distortions. Ample evidence exists to
demonstrate that correcting factor-price distortions primarily by
eliminating various capital subsidies and curtailing the growth of
urban wages through market-based pricing would increase employment opportunities and make better use of scarce capital resources, but by how much or how quickly these policies would
work is not clear. Moreover, their migration implications would
have to be ascertained. Correct pricing policies by themselves are
insufficient to alter the present employment situation significantly.
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4 Choosing appropriate labor-intensive technologies of production.
One of the principal factors inhibiting the success of any long-run
program for creating employment in urban industry and rural agriculture is the almost complete technological dependence of African nations on imported (typically labor-saving) machinery and
equipment from developed countries. Both domestic and international efforts must be made to reduce this dependence by developing technological research and adaptation capacities in the countries themselves—ideally as a cooperative and coordinated regional
endeavor. Such efforts might first be linked to the development of
small-scale, labor-intensive methods of meeting rural infrastructure needs, including roads, irrigation and drainage systems, and
essential health and educational services. In this area, scientific
and technological assistance from developed countries and their
nongovernmental organizations could prove extremely helpful.
5 Modifying the direct linkage between education and employment.
The emergence of the phenomenon of the educated unemployed is
calling into question the appropriateness of the massive quantitative expansion of African educational systems, especially at higher
levels. Formal education has become the rationing tunnel through
which all prospective jobholders must pass. As modern-sector jobs
multiply more slowly than do the numbers of persons leaving the
educational tunnel, extending the length of the tunnel and narrowing its exit become necessary. One way to moderate the excessive
demand for additional years of schooling (which, in reality, is a
demand for modern-sector jobs) would be for African governments,
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often the largest employers, to base their hiring practices and their
wage structures on other criteria. Moreover, the creation of attractive economic opportunities in rural areas would make redirecting
educational systems toward the needs of rural development easier.
At present, many African educational systems, being transplants
of colonial systems, are oriented toward preparing students to function in a small modern sector employing at the most 20 to 30 percent
of the labor force. Many of the necessary skills for development thus
remain largely neglected.
6 Reducing population growth through reductions in absolute poverty and inequality, particularly for women, along with the expanded provision of family planning and rural health services.
Clearly, any long-run solution to African employment and urbanization problems must involve a lowering of current high rates of
population growth. Even though the labor-force size for the next
two decades is already determined by today’s birth rates, the hidden momentum of population growth applies equally to labor-force
growth. Together with the demand policies identified in points 1
through 5, reducing rural population growth with its delayed impact on the urban labor supply provides an essential ingredient in
any strategy to combat the severe employment problems that African countries face now and in future years.
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